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Abstract
We investigated the effects of object relative size on priming and explicit memory for color photos of common objects.
Participants were presented with color photos of pairs of objects displayed in either appropriate or inappropriate relative
sizes. Implicit memory was assessed by speed of object size ratings whereas explicit memory was assessed by an old/new
recognition test. Study-to-test changes in relative size reduced both priming and explicit memory and had large effects for
objects displayed in large vs. small size at test. Our findings of substantial size-specific influences on priming with common
objects under some but not other conditions are consistent with instance views of object perception and priming but
inconsistent with structural description views.
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Introduction
To what extent does the size of objects influence our ability to
identify and remember them? Intuitively, size would seem to be an
important object attribute since we often rely upon knowledge of
object size for correct identification; for example, we learn to
distinguish between a viola and a violin primarily by their relative
size. The majority of recent experimental work, however, has
suggested that object size may not be represented as a fundamental
attribute of object representations used for object identification
(see Table 1); for example, Uttl, Graf, andSiegenthaler [1] found
that changes in the absolute size of objects between study and test
had very little influence on priming. It may be, however, that the
typical way in which participants’ knowledge of object size is
examined in the laboratory (e.g., on computer screens or paper
cards) does not sufficiently tax their knowledge of object size; for
example, we are all used to seeing objects of incredibly diverse
sizes depicted on computer and television screens, and these do
not look odd to us. When objects are presented in unfamiliar
relative sizes, however, they do tend to look odd, and attract our
attention; we notice immediately that something is wrong when
the children appear much smaller than the plants as in the movie
Honey, I Shrunk the Kids! By this line of reasoning, one would expect
that when objects’ relative size violates pre-existing knowledge, it
can become part of episodic memory representations, and thereby
influence the magnitude of priming. However, no study to date has
investigated the influence of object relative size on implicit and
explicit memory.
Whether non-structural object attributes such as size, color, and
orientation have an effect on identification and priming has
important implications for theories of object identification and
priming. For example, according to Biederman’s [2] recognition-
by-components model of object identification, neither geons nor
the relations among them are associated with non-structural
information such as orientation, color, and size information, and
thus, any influence due to these non-structural attributes on
identification can only be due to lower level processes, such as edge
and shape detectors [2,3]. Since each study encounter with an
object is thought to prime only a structural model, no influence of
non-structural attributes ought to be observed on priming. Recent
work from our lab and others, however, contradict the predictions
of the structural description account. For example, we have shown
that repetition priming can be influenced by study-test changes in
non-structural object attributes such as object orientation [4] and
color [5]. Similarly, working with novel line shapes and computer-
generated novel objects, Tarr and his colleagues have found that
study-test format specific effects on repetition priming depend on
participants’ familiarity with particular views [6,7].
Findings such as these are more in line with models of repetition
priming which contend that repetition priming is hyper-specific to
study-test changes in stimulus format [8–10], than with structural
description accounts of object identification. These claims of
hyper-specificity of priming to sensory and perceptual attributes of
stimuli arose from research on repetition priming with words
showing substantial effects due to study-test manipulations of font
size and type [11–15], display orientation [11,16], presentation
modality [10,17,18], or presentation voice [19–21]. Contradicting
the claims of priming hyperspecificity, however, recently some
authors have emphasized the variability of the findings obtained
with words (e.g.,[11]) and have noted that study-test changes in
stimulus format sometimes influences and sometimes does not
influence performance on repetition priming or explicit memory
tests. As a result, more flexible instance-based accounts of
repetition priming have been proposed (e.g., [11,22–25]). Indeed,
the word priming literature seems to have abandoned accounts
relying only on structural or abstract representations in favor of
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both instances and abstract representations to explain the
variability of priming effects (e.g., [25,26]).
Similarly, Uttl and Graf [4] examined the effect of study to test
changes in object orientation on identification and priming for
objects that are seen in predominantly a cardinal orientation (e.g., a
helicopter) vs. objects that are seen in a variety of orientations and
have no cardinal orientation (e.g., scissors). Whereas study to test
changes in object orientation had no effect on priming for non-
cardinal objects, they had a large influence on priming for cardinal
objects but only when cardinal objects were shown in a non-
cardinal orientation at test. Similar to words, neither structural
description models (e.g., [2,27]) nor models that postulate that
priming is hyperspecific to study to test changes in stimulus format
can explain these findings (e.g., [8–10]). However, Uttl and Graf’s
findings are easily explained by any instance view and some hybrid
views of priming (e.g., [11,22–26,28,29]).
Prior research examining the effects of object size on the
magnitude of priming is summarized in Table 1. Previous studies
have employed a variety of testing procedures including naming,
picture-fragment completion, and identification thresholds, but
have used primarily line-drawing stimuli, and only 1:2 study-test
size changes (but see [1]). Although the majority of studies have
revealed numerically larger priming effects for objects displayed in
the same size at study and test, they have rarely found such effects
to be statistically significant (but see [30], Experiments 1 & 2). To
ensure that such findings are not due to low power or other
experimental confounds (e.g., multiple item exposures), our
previous study [1] was designed to be powerful enough to detect
a 20% reduction in priming (e.g., large object set, large range of
object sizes, color photographs of objects), yet still found only a
minimal, statistically marginal effect of study-test changes in size
on priming. As suggested, earlier, however, this outcome may only
mean that the size manipulation was too small in that all objects
were represented as smaller than a standard computer screen,
whereas our real-life experience entails perceiving objects much
smaller than to much larger than our physical body size.
Furthermore, instance views of priming suggest that the effects
of study-test changes in object size on priming may depend on
participants’ familiarity with a specific object size; specifically,
priming will be larger for objects tested in an unfamiliar size when
they were studied in an unfamiliar than when studied in a familiar
size. Given that modern undergraduates are presumably experts at
recognizing all variety of object sizes on video screens and given
further the unwieldiness of bringing in a sufficient number of real
objects in various familiar and unfamiliar sizes to the standard
psychology laboratory, we chose to investigate this idea by
manipulating the relative size in which objects are presented on
the computer screen. We hypothesized that when the size of an
object displayed in context violates our expectations (e.g., a large
book next to a small bus), larger priming effects may emerge due
to prior study encounters with the object displayed in an
unfamiliar versus a familiar relative size.
In contrast to priming, previous research on object size has
shown that it does have an effect on identification and on explicit
memory (the ability to recognize them as having been encountered
previously; see e.g., [1,31,32]; see Table 2). Moreover, consistent
with previous findings with human faces [33,34], Uttl et al. [1]
recently reported that the effects of changing object size between
study and test on explicit memory are asymmetric. Specifically,
performance on an old/new recognition explicit memory test was
affected by study to test changes in object size when test objects
were large but not when test objects were small.
This asymmetry in old/new recognition performance is easily
explained by the well-known limitations of the human visual
system, including its increasingly poor processing of higher spatial
frequencies due to the acuity limitations related to spatial density
and distribution of rods and cones on human retina [35–37].
Specifically, encountering small objects at study will result in less
detailed representations than encountering large objects as the
human visual system processes higher spatial frequencies (detail)
increasingly more poorly. The extra detail included in the study
Table 1. Previous studies of object size effects on priming.
Source Exp. Test task Size change Stimuli Effect Comments
Biederman & Cooper [31] 1 naming 3.5–6.2u LD + NExp. prior
Biederman & Cooper [31] 3 naming 3.5–6.2u LD + NExp. prior
Cave & Squire [49] 2 naming 1:1.5 LD +
Fiser & Biederman [50] 1 naming 3.5–6.2u PH (b&w) + NExp. prior
Zimmer [51] 1 size judgments 1:2.1 LD n/i no priming
Zimmer [51] 2 size judgments 1:2.1 LD n/i no priming
Zimmer [51] 3 word-picture matching 5–8 cm LD 2
Srinivas [30] 1 size typicality 8.8–17.22u LD ++
Srinivas [30] 2 fragment identification 8.8–17.22u LD ++
Seamon et al. [52] 2 affective preference 1:2.5 LD 2 MExp
Furmanski & Engel [53] 3 identification thresholds 8.2–16.5u PH (b&w) + MExp/Transfer
Furmanski & Engel [53] 4 identification threshold 8.2–16.5u PH (b&w) + Mexp/Transfer
Stankiewicz & Hummel [54] 2 naming 2.5–5u LD +
Ryan et al. [55] 1 naming 5.7–10u LD 2
Uttl et al. [1] 1 identification threshold 4–16u PH (color) +
Note. LD=line drawings; PH=photographs; MExp=participants were given multiple exposures to objects during the study; MExp/Transfer=hundreds of study trials
with each object followed by transfer block trials; NExp prior=participants were asked to read names of all objects prior to the experiment; 2=nonsignificant size
difference in opposite direction; +=nonsignificant but numerically larger size effect; ++=significant size effect; n/i=not interpretable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003109.t001
Object Relative Size
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subsequent test when the test object is small, however, and
therefore, lacks detailed information. In contrast, the extra detail
included in the study representation of large objects is helpful
when the test object is also large, and therefore, includes detailed
information [1,34].
One may ask why this asymmetric old/new recognition effect
reported by Uttl et al. [1] (see also [33] for similar asymmetric
effects found with photographs of faces) has not been found in
previous studies of object size effects on old/new recognition listed
in Table 2. A simple explanation for this discrepancy is that in
contrast to Uttl et al. [1], previous studies of object size effects have
used primarily line-drawings that scale with no loss of detail and
therefore establish equally rich memory representations. Accord-
ingly, the results of the present study should replicate these
asymmetric old/new recognition effects reported by Uttl et al. [1]
and also find asymmetric priming effects, provided that relative
size has an effect on priming.
In addition to examining whether the relative size of objects
influences priming and explicit memory, we also hoped to rectify
some possible shortcomings of earlier research on object
identification and priming. To this end, we used color photographs
of common objects rather than line-drawings, employed a one-
week study-test delay to limit ceiling effects on explicit memory test
performance, used a large number of objects to ensure the
generalizability of our findings, and designed the study to be
powerful enough to detect a 33% reduction in priming due to
object size manipulations. Objects were presented by means of a
fade-in procedure in which target-relevant information accumu-
lates over time during both study and test (see [1,4,5]). This
procedure mimics the perceptual experience of identifying objects
through a lifting fog, and is similar to picture-fragment completion
methods used by prior investigations (e.g., [30,38]) but has greater
measurement precision and high reliability.
Participants were presented with photos of two common objects
on each trial; one object was designated the context and the other
object was designed the target. Contexts and targets were selected
so as to be approximately the same size in real life. To manipulate
the object’s relative size, the displays showed the target either in an
appropriate relative size (i.e., the same size as the context) or in an
inappropriate relative size (i.e., much smaller or much larger than
the context). To emphasize the encoding of relative size
information, the study task focused participants’ attention on
object size by requiring them to decide which object was more
likely to be larger in real life. Participants studied each context-
target pair twice: in the first study phase, both objects were slowly
faded in until participants made a relative size decision; in the
second study phase, the context object appeared first fully faded-in
and the target object was slowly faded in until participants made
the relative size decision. One week later, implicit memory was
assessed by means of the same rating task and presentation method
as the second study phase; priming was indexed by the facilitation
in the rating speed of studied versus non-studied targets. Explicit
memory was tested by means of an old/new recognition test. On
each trial, the context object was displayed first, and participants
were required to classify it as either artificial or natural ensuring
that participants paid attention to the context object. Next, the
target object was slowly faded in until participants made an old/
new decision. For both implicit and explicit tasks, each target was
displayed in either the same relative size at study and test or in
different relative sizes at study and test. Both implicit and explicit
memory tests were given after a 1-week delay to avoid ceiling
effects on the old/new recognition explicit memory test.
A secondary question addressed by the study was whether the
influence of the relative size manipulation on priming and explicit
memory could be mediated by specific associations between the
objects in each context-target pair or by relative size per se. For this
purpose, each target appeared either with the same context object at
study and test or with a different context object at study and test.
Previous research has shown that context-target associations can
influence both the magnitude of priming on word stem completion
tests and performance on verbal explicit memory tests such as cued
recall tests (e.g., [39–43]). For example, Graf and Schacter [41]
foundassociativepriming,largereffectsfortargetspresentedwiththe
same versus different contexts, on a word stem completion test, and
they showed that performance on a cued recall test is higher when
targets appear with the same contexts versus different contexts at
study and test. Consistent with these findings, one might expect
associative effects on priming and on old/new recognition test
performance in the present experiment.
Methods
Participants and design
One hundred sixty undergraduate students participated for
course credit. The design had one between-subjects factor: test
type (implicit, explicit) and four within-subjects factors: history
(studied, non-studied), target size at test (small, large), study/test
relative size (same size, different size target, different size context),
and study/test context (intact, recombined). Ninety-six partici-
pants were assigned to the implicit memory test and 64 were
assigned to the explicit memory test condition. Figure 1 shows the
critical conditions and how object photos appeared in each of
them (the figure shows critical conditions only for the intact study/
test context condition).
Materials
A set of 360 color photos of common objects was obtained and
digitized in true color mode. Each object was ‘cut out’ from its
background, superimposed and centered on a 1280 by 960 pixels
white background, and then scaled to fill two different rectangles,
either 512 by 384 pixels for large displays or 160 by 120 pixels for
small displays.
Table 2. Previous studies of object size effects on old/new
recognition.
Source Exp.
Size
change Stimuli Effect Comments
Biederman & Cooper [31] 2 3.5–6.2u LD ++
Jolicoeur [32] 1 LD ++
Srinivas [30] 3 8.8–17.22u LD ++ CEs
Seamon et al. [52] 2 1:2.5 LD ++ MExp
Zimmer [51] 1 1:2.1 LD n/i CEs
Zimmer [51] 2 1:2.1 LD ++ CEs
Zimmer [51] 3 1:1.6 LD n/i CEs
Uttl et al. [1] 1 4–16u PH (color) ++ for large at
test only
Note. LD=line drawings; PH=photographs; MExp=participants were given
multiple exposures to objects during the study; MExp/TP=many identification
trials followed by transfer block trials; NExp prior=participants were asked to
read names of all objects prior to the experiment; 2=nonsignificant size
difference in opposite direction; +=nonsignificant but numerically larger size
effect; ++=significant size effect; n/i=results are not interpretable; CEs=ceiling
effects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003109.t002
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by repeating the following procedure. First, four photos of objects
were selected randomly, without replacement, from the pool of
available photos, subject to the constraint that they had to be all
about equally large in real-life. Second, two of these four objects
were randomly chosen as targets, leaving the other two objects as
contexts. Third, the targets were randomly combined with the
contexts to create two intact pairs. Recombined pairs were formed by
switching the context objects between the two intact pairs. Finally,
all pairs were checked, and if any pair, either intact or
recombined, had two strongly-associated objects (e.g., a teacup
and a teaspoon), the subset of objects was returned to the pool of
items. This procedure was followed until all pairs met the criteria.
For purposes of counterbalancing items across participants and
conditions, critical context-target pairs were divided randomly into
16 sets (Cr1 to Cr16). Each target from any of these sets was
associated with two contexts in the same set. Each target was
associated with one context in the intact pair and with another
context in the recombined pair. This materials arrangement
ensured that both of the contexts associated with each target also
occurred in the same set of context-target pairs.
Seven practice pairs (Pr) and 48 filler pairs (Fi) were formed in
exactly the same way as the critical pairs. The former pairs were
used for instruction and practice and the latter pairs were used to
equate the number of studied and non-studied pairs on the old/
new recognition test. Finally, sixteen catch pairs (Ca) were formed
by combining two unrelated objects in such a way that, in real life,
each target object was either much smaller or much larger than its
assigned context object. The catch pairs were employed to ensure
that participants followed the relative size rating instructions and
were not simply responding based on target object display size.
All picture pairs were displayed on a 17-inch color monitor,
driven by a color graphics card operating in 16.7 million color
mode at a resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels.
The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee,
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, BC,
Canada, and a written consent was obtained from each participant
prior to participation in the study.
Procedure
Participants participated in two sessions, a study and a test
session, separated by one week. Each session lasted between 45
and 60 minutes. The experiment was described as examining
perception of pictures of objects. The study session had two phases
both requiring participants to decide which one of the two objects
was more likely to be larger in real-life. At the beginning of the first
phase, participants were presented with three practice and two
catch context-target pairs that were color printed on 11 by 14 inch
paper cards. Using these cards, the experimenter explained the
size decision task. For each pair of objects, participants were
required to decide which one was likely to be larger in real-life.
They practiced this task until the experimenter was satisfied that
they understood the task.
Following instructions and practice, participants performed the
relative size decision test administered on a computer. On each
trial, a context object was displayed either on the left or on the
right of the computer screen with the target object displayed on
the other side of the screen. Both objects were faded-in
simultaneously. The fade-in procedure operated on the 1024 by
768 pixel map of each picture. The program stepped through this
map, in a pseudo-random sequence, and on each step, it turned on
one of the not-yet-turned-on pixels. The generator of a pseudo-
random sequence was designed in such a way that no pixel in the
map was visited twice (i.e., sampling without replacement), and the
relations between the number of pixels turned on and the time
elapsed from the start of fade-in was linear (20 s were required to
turn on all pixels). The number key press generated a software
interrupt, stopped the fade-in procedure, and caused the current
fade-in level to be recorded in terms of the proportion of pixels
turned on prior to the keyboard button press. Participants were
instructed ‘‘to decide which one of the two objects, in your
opinion, is more likely to be larger in real-life’’ and were instructed
to make each decision as quickly and accurately as possible. They
pressed 1 on the keyboard number pad if the object on the left side
was larger, and pressed 2 if the object on the right was larger.
During the second phase, participants performed the same
relative size decision test with the same context-target pairs, with
the following modification: on each trial, one object (the context
object) appeared immediately; after a brief delay (1.5 seconds) a
second object (the target object) was slowly faded in until
participants made the relative size decision by pressing the
appropriate number key. Following instructions and practice,
Figure 1. Examples of object pairs displayed in large vs. small
relative size at test by various study conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003109.g001
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exactlythesamecontext-targetpairs(i.e.,thesamepairspresented in
the same relative and absolute sizes) as in phase 1 except that
context-target pairs were presented in a new random sequence. The
Phase 1 and Phase 2 pairs (the study list items) included 6 sets of
intact pairs (Cr1,C r 2,C r 3,C r 5,C r 6,C r 7) and 6 sets of recombined
pairs (Cr9,C r 10,C r 11,C r 13,C r 14,C r 15). In addition, the Phase 1 and
Phase 2 pairs also included four sets of catch pairs (Ca1 to Ca4), one
set in each of the context-target size combinations, to ensure that
participants followed the size decision instructions.
The second session (Phase 3) followed one week later; at this
time, participants were given either the implicit or explicit memory
test. The implicit memory test was the object size decision task
used during study. The explicit memory test was an old/new
recognition test. On each trial of the old/new recognition test, the
context and target were presented in exactly the same way as they
were presented during the implicit memory test with the following
exceptions: (1) when the context appeared, participants were
required to say aloud whether the object was artificial or natural,
to ensure that they attended to the context object; and (2) their task
was to decide, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether each
target (the faded-in object) had appeared previously during the
study session, regardless of the size and regardless of the context in
which it had appeared. Participants pressed ‘1’ on the keyboard
number pad if the target was old, and they pressed ‘2’ if the target
was new. The computer recorded both the accuracy and speed of
each decision. Immediately after each key press, both the context
and target were erased, and the next trial began in about two
seconds.
The Phase 3 pairs included 6 sets of pairs that were previously
studied intact (intact pair sets: Cr1,C r 2,C r 3,C r 5,C r 6,C r 7), 6 sets
of pairs that were previously studied recombined (recombined pair
sets: Cr9,C r 10,C r 11,C r 13,C r 14,C r 15), and 4 sets of pairs that
were not studied (Cr4,C r 8,C r 12,C r 16). Moreover, as shown in
Figure 1, the previously studied target objects could appear in the
same size with the same size context (e.g., Cr1,C r 5), in a different
size with the same size context (e.g., Cr2,C r 6) or in the same size
with a different size context (e.g., Cr3,C r 7). Phase 3 pairs also
included two sets of filler pairs to equalize the number of studied
versus non-studied targets and contexts and eight sets of catch
pairs (four of them previously-studied [intact pair sets Ca1 to Ca4]
and 4 of them non-studied [intact pair sets Ca5 to Ca8]) to ensure
that participants followed the object size decision instructions
appropriately. Table 3 shows an example of how sets of context-
target pairs were assigned for one participant.
Across participants, counterbalancing ensured that each set of
critical pairs (Cr1 to Cr16) appeared equally often in each of the 16
experimental conditions. Finally, context-target pairs were pre-
sented in a random order in each phase, and the order was
randomized for each participant.
Results
The critical dependent measure on the object decision test was
the proportion of pixels required for making decisions for studied
and non-studied targets in each experimental condition. For the
old/new recognition test, the dependent measures were hits (the
proportion of targets correctly classified as old/studied) and
correct rejections (the proportion of targets correctly classified as
new/non-studied). The alpha was set at .05 for all statistical tests.
Object size decisions and priming
Figure2showsthemeanproportionsofpixelsrequiredformaking
object size decisions in each experimental and control condition
(error bars denote 95% within-subjects confidence intervals [44]).
For non-studied objects, participants were faster to make size
decisions when they were shown as relatively large (0.331 pixels
corresponding to 6.62 s) than when they were shown as relatively
small (0.474 pixels corresponding to 9.48 s). An ANOVA of
performance on non-studied targets showed a significant effect of
relative size, F(1,95)=199.31, MSe=0.010, g
2=.68.
The means in Figure 2 reveal priming: Overall, a smaller
proportion of visible pixels was required for rating studied (0.290
corresponding to 5.8 s) than non-studied (0.402 corresponding to
8.04 s) targets in all experimental conditions [smallest t(95)=4.18].
Because of the differences in baseline performance (i.e., perfor-
mance on non-studied targets), priming scores were used for all
further statistical analyses.
The critical question examined whether priming is influenced
by the study-to-test changes in relative size. Figure 2 shows that
study-to-test changes in relative size influenced priming but only
when the target size changed between study and test and only for
target objects displayed as large at test. Specifically, priming was
Table 3. An example of how sets of context-target pairs were
assigned for one participant.
Phase 1 & 2 pairs
(72Cr+8Ca)
Phase 3 pairs
(96Cr+48Fi+16Ca) Pair set # of pairs
I-CLTS I-CLTS (S) Cr1 6
I-CLTL I-CLTS (D/T) Cr2 6
I-CSTS I-CLTS (D/C) Cr3 6
I-CLTS (N) Cr4 6
R-CLTS I-CLTS (S) Cr5 6
R-CLTL I-CLTS (D/T) Cr6 6
R-CSTS I-CLTS (D/C) Cr7 6
I-CLTS (N) Cr8 6
I-CSTL I-CSTL (S) Cr9 6
I-CSTS I-CSTL (D/T) Cr10 6
I-CLTL I-CSTL (D/C) Cr11 6
I-CSTL (N) Cr12 6
R-CSTL I-CSTL (S) Cr13 6
R-CSTS I-CSTL (D/T) Cr14 6
R-CLTL I-CSTL (D/C) Cr15 6
I-CSTL (N) Cr16 6
I-CLTS (N) Fi1 24
I-CSTL (N) Fi2 24
R-CLTS I-CLTS (S) Ca1 2
R-CLTL I-CLTL (S) Ca2 2
R-CSTL I-CSTL (S) Ca3 2
R-CSTS I-CSTS (S) Ca4 2
I-CLTS (N) Ca5 2
I-CLTL (N) Ca6 2
I-CSTL (N) Ca7 2
I-CSTS (N) Ca8 2
Note. In this table, intact pairs are preceded by ‘I’ and re-arranged pairs by ‘R’.
Contexts are denoted by ‘C’ and targets are denoted by ‘T’. Contexts or targets
displayed in small size have subscript ‘S’ and contexts and targets displayed in
large size have subscripts ‘L’. The letters in parentheses indicate whether the
target was displayed in the same size condition (S), in a different size target
condition (D/T), in a different size context condition (D/C), or whether it was not
studied (N). Cr=critical pairs, Fi=fixed pairs, Ca=catch pairs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003109.t003
Object Relative Size
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than when it was different (0.078). In contrast, priming was not
affected by study/test changes in context object size. For objects
displayed small at test, priming was comparable in the same
(0.133), different target size (0.132), and different context size
(0.115) conditions. Finally, Figure 2 indicates that there was only a
small influence due to study-to-test changes in context objects (i.e.,
intact/recombined pair manipulation).
These observations were confirmed by two sets of ANOVAs of
the priming scores. First, an omnibus ANOVA of the priming
scores that had target relative size at test (small, large), study/test
relative size condition (same, different size target, different size
context), and study/test context (intact, recombined) as within
subject factors showed the following significant main effects and
interactions: target relative size at test, F(1,95)=7.09, MSe=0.033,
g
2=.07; study/test context (intact, recombined), F(1,95)=12.27,
MSe=0.003, g
2=.11; study/test relative size condition,
F(2,190)=7.08, MSe=0.004, g
2=.07; interaction between target
size at test and study/test relative size condition, F(2,190)=16.30,
MSe=0.003, g
2=.15. No other effects approached significance.
Follow-up ANOVAs of the priming scores for targets displayed
small at test with study/test relative size condition as a within-
subject factor showed a significant main effect of study/test relative
size condition, F(2,190)=4.56, MSe=0.004, g
2=.05. Follow-up
ANOVAs of the priming scores for targets displayed large at test
with study/test relative size condition as within subject factor
showed a significant main effect of study/test relative size
condition, F(2,190)=21.72, MSe=0.003, g
2=.19.
Second, planned ANOVAs of the priming scores focused on
three contrasts: (1) priming for the intact pairs in the same size vs.
different target size conditions; (2) priming for the intact pairs in
the same size vs. different context size conditions; and (3) priming
in the same relative size condition for the intact vs. recombined
pairs. The first ANOVA of priming scores for the intact pairs with
target test size and study/test relative size (same, different target
size) as within subject factors showed a significant main effect of
target test size, F(1, 95)=11.08, MSe=0.015, g
2=.10, a significant
main effect of study/test change in target size, F(1, 95)=5.30,
MSe=0.004, g
2=.05, and a significant interaction between target
test size and study/test change in target size, F(1, 95)=14.81,
MSe=0.004, g
2=.13. A follow-up simple effects analysis showed
that the main effect of study/test target size was significant for
large test targets, F(1, 95)=23.72, MSe=0.003, g
2=.20, but not
for small test targets, F,1, g
2=.008. The second ANOVA of
priming scores for the intact pairs with target test size and study/
test relative size (same, different context size) showed no significant
effects [target test size, F(1, 95)=1.89, MSe=0.015, g
2=.02;
study/test relative size, F(1, 95)=1.35, MSe=0.004, g
2=.01;
interaction between target relative size at test and study/test
relative size, F(1, 95)=0.01, MSe=0.003, g
2=,.01]. The third
ANOVA of the priming scores in the same relative size conditions
with target test size and study/test context (intact/recombined) as
within-subject factors showed a marginal effect of target relative
size at test, F(1, 95)=3.85, MSe=0.014, g
2=.04, p=.053. No
other effects approached significance.
Old/New Recognition
Figure 3 shows the performance on the old/new recognition test
in terms of correct decisions for studied items and false alarms for
non-studied items (error bars denote 95% within-subjects
confidence intervals [44]). For non-studied targets, performance
shows some variability across experimental conditions (0.14 for
small targets and 0.13 for large targets). For this reason, all
statistical analyses were conducted on scores corrected for baseline
performance by subtracting false alarms (incorrect decisions on
non-studied targets) from hits (correct decisions on studied targets).
For studied targets, the corrected scores revealed that overall
participants were more accurate on targets displayed in large size
Figure 2. The mean proportion of pixels required for making ratings on the relative size rating test for photos of objects, as a function
of targets’ relative size at test (small, large), study/test context (intact, recombined), study/test relative size condition (same, different
size target, different size context), and history (studied, non-studied). Error bars denote 95% within-subject confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003109.g002
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in relative size influenced accuracy only when targets were
displayed in large test size and when target size changed between
study and test; accuracy was higher for objects displayed in large
test size when target size was the same (0.76) at study and test than
when it was different (0.58). There were no or only minimal effects
due to study-to-test changes in contexts (accuracy was 0.69 for
intact pairs and 0.67 for recombined pairs).
These observations were confirmed by two sets of ANOVAs.
First, an omnibus ANOVA that had target test size (small, large),
study/test relative size condition (same, different size target,
different size context), study/test context (intact, recombined) as
within-subject factors showed the following significant main effects
and interactions: target test size, F(1,63)=27.92, MSe=.03,
g
2=.31; study/test relative size condition, F(2,126)=30.55,
MSe=.02, g
2=.33; interaction between target test size and
study/test relative size condition, F(2,126)=47.62, MSe=.02,
g
2=.43. No other effects approached significance [study/test
context (intact, recombined), F(1,63)=2.48, MSe=.03, p=.12,
g
2=.04; target test size by study/test context interaction,
F(1,63)=0.11, MSe=0.03, p=0.75, g
2,.01; study/test context
by study/test relative size condition, F(2, 126)=0.19, MSe=0.03,
p=0.83, g
2,.01; target test size by study/test context by study/
test condition interaction, F(2, 126)=0.40, MSe=0.02, p=0.67,
g
2,.01]. Follow-up ANOVAs in the small target test size
condition with study/test relative size condition as a within-
subject factor did not approach significance, F(2,126)=2.06,
MSe=0.02, p=0.13, g
2=0.03. A follow-up ANOVA in the large
target test size conditions with study/test relative size condition as
a within-subject factor was significant, F(2,126)=79.67,
MSe=0.02, g
2=.56. Simple effect analyses revealed that perfor-
mance in the same study/test condition differed from the different
size target condition, F(1,63)=77.93, MSe=0.03, g
2=0.55, but
not from the different context size condition, F(1,63)=3.16,
MSe=0.01, p=0.08, g
2=0.05.
Discussion
The findings replicate and extend several results from previous
research.Ontheimplicitmemorytest,therelativesizedecisionstook
much longer for new (non-studied) objects displayed small versus
large at test, consistent with previous research showing that small vs.
large objects are more difficult to identify [1], our experience in
identifying objects from small vs. large photos, and our experience in
identifying objects afar when higher spatial frequencies are lost from
the image [1,34]. Moreover, there was substantial priming in all test
conditions due to prior study. Important new findings showed that
study-test changes in target object size influenced repetition priming
but only for objects displayed large at test, confirming the prediction
of the asymmetric priming effect derived from the limitation of the
human visual system. Study-test changes in context object size did
not affect the size of repetition priming suggesting that relative size
changes combined with absolute size changes reduce priming rather
than relative size changes in general. The possibility that size effects
on priming are simply due to absolute size changes between study
and test is eliminated by the results of previous research: study to test
changes of object absolute size had no or only minimal effects on
priming in both our own previous study using color photos of
common objects [1] as well as in previous studies using primarily
line-drawings of objects (see Table 1). In combination, these results
suggest that object size affects priming at least when object size
violates our pre-existing knowledge, when it is surprising, and when
the study task focuses participants’ attention on object size (see also
[30]).
On the explicit old/new recognition test, the accuracy of
making old/new decisions was higher for objects displayed large at
Figure 3. The proportion of ‘‘old’’ decisions (hits for old items and false alarms for new items) on old/new recognition test for
photos of objects, as a function of targets’ relative size at test (small, large), study/test context (intact, recombined), study/test
relative size condition (same, different size target, different size context), and history (studied, non-studied). Error bars denote 95%
within-subject confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003109.g003
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but only for objects tested as large, consistent with both predictions
derived from the limitations of the human visual system as well as
prior findings [1,33,34]. The intact/recombined manipulation did
not affect old/new recognition accuracy perhaps due to the
relatively weak associative processing during study conferred by
the relative size rating only. Associative effects are typically only
found following study tasks that require participants to associate
the two items (a context and a target) together by stronger means,
for example, by asking participants to create meaningful sentences
combining the context target pairs. To illustrate, in Uttl et al. [26],
participants saw a context first, rated its pleasantness, and when a
target appeared, they were required to create a meaningful
sentence connecting the context and the target in a meaningful
way. With this strong associative manipulation, Uttl et al. [26]
found strong intact/recombined effects on old/new recognition.
In combination, our findings highlight that the results previously
obtained with line-drawings of objects, for example, the lack of
asymmetric size effects on explicit memory tests, do not necessarily
generalize to color photos of objects. This asymmetry of study/test
size change effects on implicit and explicit memory is consistent
with the predictions derived from drawing a parallel between
spatial resolution of each image displayed on a computer monitor
and the spatial resolving power of the human visual system for
objects seen from afar, when high spatial frequencies of retinal
images of objects seen from afar cannot be resolved [1,34]. To
illustrate, if a large test display includes 100 features or bits of
information whereas a small test display includes only 25 features,
the stored representations of large objects include as many as 100
features whereas the stored representations of small objects can
include only 25 features. Thus, participants are most likely to find
a match between information provided by large test displays and
information included in study trial representations of large but not
small objects, and consequently, their performance will be more
affected when they are tested using large vs. small test displays. In
contrast, information provided by small test displays is likely
included in the study representations of both small and large
objects, and therefore, participants’ performance is unaffected by
study/test size manipulations.
It could be argued that the parallel effects of relative size on
implicit and explicit memory tests are due to participants engaging
in explicit memory strategies on putatively implicit memory tests.
However, several lines of independent evidence strongly argue
against this possibility. First, knowing whether or not objects
appeared during prior study was irrelevant to participants’
performance on the task rating the relative size of context and
target objects. Second, the experimental design – a large number
of trials and a seven-day delay – made it difficult if not impossible
for participants to remember the decisions they made one week
earlier. Third, performance on these two implicit and explicit
memory tests is differentially affected by various other object
attributes such as absolute size [1], object orientation [4], and
object color [5], demonstrating functional dissociations between
these two tests. Finally, performance on the implicit and explicit
memory tests in this study was statistically independent. Specif-
ically, the average within-subject correlation (each based on 72
items) between priming on the phase 2 implicit task and old/new
recognition performance over the same items was r=0.01, no
different from zero (p=0.93). If implicit test performance results
were due to participants attempting to intentionally retrieve their
response from the previous phase, we would expect a significant
positive correlation between the implicit and explicit memory test
performance. However, a zero correlation is a strong evidence of
divergent test validity; it indicates that implicit memory test
performance was not influenced by explicit memory retrieval. In
contrast, the average within-subject correlations between priming
on the phase 2 implicit task and priming one week later (phase 3
implicit task) was r=0.36, p,0.002. While each of these lines of
evidence alone have been cited in the past as evidence that implicit
test performance was not due to explicit memory retrieval,
collectively, these four lines of evidence make it nearly impossible
that participants engaged in explicit recollection on this implicit
memory test and that such explicit recollection is responsible for
the results obtained [45,46].
The findings of size-specific priming effects with common objects
parallels previous reports of priming effects specific to the color and
spatial orientation in which objects were displayed for study and test
[4,5]. None of these effects can be readily accommodated by models
that explain priming effects in terms of abstract structural
representations (e.g., [2,8,9,47]). For example, Biederman’s recog-
nition-by-components model does not include any provision for
coding size, colour, or other episodic information. According to this
model, it is assumed that the structural representation of the geons
alone is the only information necessary to identify and remember
objects; results from our lab and others though suggest a necessary
revision to this tenet. Similar to Biederman’s model, Tulving and
Schacter [9] have also postulated that object identification and
priming is mediated by representations of structural properties.
Their model differs, however, in that they suggest that the structural
description system is closely linked with the episodic memory system,
and that this system can code objects in terms of specific properties
(e.g., color, spatial orientation, size, context) that are unique to each
occurrence. Therefore, hybrid models such as this one can
accommodate our findings of size-specific priming effects by
assuming that the identification of an object recruits both its
structuraldescriptionsaswellasitsepisodicmemoryrepresentations.
Instead of highlighting the contributions of potentially different
representation systems (e.g., structural, episodic), other researchers
have explained repetition priming effects in terms of instance
representations [4,11,22–26,28,29]. According to these views,
each encounter with a stimulus engages a unique set of sensory
and perceptual processes, and as a consequence, this same set of
processes can be carried out more fluently in the future. The
enduring consequence of processing an item is regarded as its
episodic memory representation. It is assumed that when required
to identify a familiar object, both new and preexisting represen-
tations of the object are recruited for its identification and
influence how it is perceived, interpreted and encoded. This new
episodic representation will then influence subsequent identifica-
tion less to the extent that an object already has many pre-existing
representations in memory. By these views, identification is a
dynamic process and the influence of various object attributes such
as size or perceived size on identification and priming depends not
only on a match between attributes present at study and test but
on a number of factors, including participants’ familiarity with a
specific view of objects including their perceived size, requirements
of study and test tasks that focus attention either towards or away
from the processing of a specific attribute (e.g., size, color,
orientation), and cues provided at test (which may include or
exclude the specific attribute).
Our findings of substantial size-specific influences on priming
with common objects under some but not other conditions are
consistent with instance views of object perception and priming
but inconsistent with pure structural description views. These size-
specific influences complement our previous research showing
orientation and color-specific effects on object priming. More
importantly, this combination of findings strengthens the claim
that priming effects with common objects are similar to priming
Object Relative Size
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They suggest that we should abandon theoretical accounts that are
unique to one kind of material in favor of accounts that cover
findings across various materials including words, objects, and
faces.
Finally, our findings have forensic implications. They show that
participants’ ability to recognize previously seen objects as
previously seen is substantially affected by the size (or distance)
in which the object was initially encountered. If an object was seen
small or from afar, eyewitnesses are far less likely to correctly
identify the object as being present in the crime scene than if it was
seen large or from nearby. In turn, our findings support the
proposal for using object arrays or lineups for cross-examining
eyewitnesses about their ability to correctly identify crime scene
objects [1,48].
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